Qayum karzai biography of martin

President of Afghanistan from 2002 to 2014

"Karzai" redirects here. For the surname, see Karzai (surname).

Hamid Karzai (; Pashto/Persian: حامد کرزی, Pashto pronunciation:[ˈhɑmɪdkarˈzai], Dari pronunciation:[ˈhɒːmɪdkaɾzeˈiː]; born 24 December 1957) is an Afghan statesman who served as the fourth president of Afghanistan from June 2002 to September 2014, including as the first elected president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from December 2004 to September 2014. He previously served as Chairman of the Afghan Interim Administration from December 2001 to July 2002. He is the chief (khān) of the PopalzaiDurrani tribe of Pashtuns in Kandahar Province.

Born in Kandahar, Karzai graduated from Habibia High School in Kabul and later received a master's degree in India in the 1980s. He moved to Pakistan where he was active as a fundraiser for the Afghan rebels during the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989) and its aftermath. He briefly served as Deputy Foreign Minister in the Islamic State of Afghanistan government. In July 1999, Karzai's father was assassinated and Karzai succeeded him as head of the Popalzai tribe. In October 2001 the United States invasion of Afghanistan began and Karzai led the Pashtun tribes in and around Kandahar in an uprising against the Taliban; he became a dominant political figure after the removal of the Taliban regime in late 2001. During the December 2001 International Conference on Afghanistan in Germany, Karzai was selected by prominent Afghan political figures to serve a six-month term as chairman of the Interim Administration.

He was then chosen for a two-year term as interim president during the 2002 loya jirga (grand assembly) that was held in Kabul, Afghanistan. After the 2004 presidential election, Karzai was declared the winner and became President of Afghanistan. He won a second five-year term in the 2009 presidential election; this term ended in September 2014,^&#

The Afghan president's brother sat with former Taleban leaders at a religious meal hosted by the Saudi King Abdullah last month, the BBC has learnt.

The meeting is regarded as a possible prelude to talks between the Afghan government and the Islamic movement.

Reports suggest negotiations took place during this meeting, although this has been strongly denied by both sides.

Recently, British and US officials said a resolution to the conflict would require negotiations with the Taleban.

'No formal talks'

Last month the king of Saudi Arabia played host to an extraordinary cast of political players during a religious meal.

The BBC understands that Afghan President Hamid Karzai's older brother, Qayum Karzai, was in attendance, as well as former Taleban leaders.

Also present was the former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and a delegation of at least 15 Afghans.

In addition, men representing every political movement in Afghanistan "at some point or another" were at the meal, the Taleban's former ambassdor to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, who was also present, told the BBC.

He said that there was an eagerness in the room to find a solution to end the violence in Afghanistan but denied that any "formal talks" had taken place.

For their part, both the Afghan government and the Taleban have also flatly denied that there were any negotiations.

But while it is not clear what was discussed in Saudi Arabia, the meeting of leaders and politicians appears to be far more than a coincidence.

In the past, Saudi Arabia has acted as a broker between the Taleban and other parties. It was one of only three countries (Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates were the others) to recognise the Taleban government in the mid-1990s.

The presence of the former Mr Sharif could also be significa

The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan have been left exposed at a critical point of their mission, but not due to a lack of public support ”” it’s the Harper govern- ment that’s absent without leave. While the Forces can point to significant, if painful, gains in flashpoints such as Panjwai and Zhari districts, as well as Kandahar City, the Prime Minister and his team can boast of not a single clear policy gain, especially not where diplomatic intervention is needed most: pressuring the Taliban leadership in their safe havens in Pakistan, and rehabilitating the Karzai regime in Kabul.

The Harper government continues to acquiesce to the Bush administration’s results-barren command of an aid and security mission that is international in name only. Washington’s blunders have compromised a force whose success is crucial to Canada’s hopes for an eventual end to its combat obligations: the Afghan National Army, or ANA.

At issue is a web of political influence, backed by enor- mous sums of US military and humanitarian aid dollars, extending from the White House through an array of gov- ernment officials, neoconservative outriders and avaricious Afghan-American businessmen. Afghans and foreign observers who’ve witnessed the web’s growth describe it as a network of aggressive political adventurers, hungry for influence and lucrative development contracts.

”œThese people have hijacked a weak system,” says a senior member of President Hamid Karzai’s staff, who spoke on condition of anonymity. ”œPeople here initially welcomed diaspora Afghans with open arms and looked to them for guidance. But that’s changed. It’s clear that too many Afghan-Americans paraded their patriotism only to promote their careers, or to advance ethnic agendas, or just to fill their pockets. On top of that, their scheming has distorted policy in Washington, a lot like Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress at